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AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEGOTIABILITY CONCEPT
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
HERBERT L. SHERMAN, JR.* AND JOHN M. FEENEY, JR.f
INTRODUCTION
A hasty glance through the index of legal periodicals quickly
discloses the generous number of articles that have been written
on the general subject of the proposed Uniform Commercial
Code. Although some have become dated by the frequent re-
visions of the Code, the great majority are still valid. Generally
speaking, most of the published articles have treated specific di-
visions and sections of the Code, or have examined the high
points throughout the entire Code. Invariably they compare the
Code with all the leading uniform acts now in existence.
The aim of this undertaking, however, is to examine the im-
pact, if any, that the new Uniform Commercial Code may have
on our concept of negotiability as it has evolved to the present
time. Analysis will be confined to this one broad topic, but our
considerations are not limited to one section of the Code. Al-
though analytical thought about the negotiability concept has
been applied to its many segments, which we call rules, appar-
ently nothing has been written on the Code that has emphasized
the expansion of the concept itself which is now possible.
The inspiration for this article stems from the ostensibly inno-
cent words "within this article" found in Section 3-104 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.' It is contended that these words
could completely change the historical policy of the courts and
launch us into an entirely new era for the negotiability concept.
A full understanding of this position can only be gained by an
inquiry into the historical development of negotiability.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
t Third Year Law Student, University of Pittsburgh.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104 (1952). All future references will
be to this draft. It might be noted that this is the final draft; in this form
it has already been introduced before several state legislatures.
The first part of Section 3-104 is as follows: "(1) Any writing to be a
negotiable instrument within this Article must...." Thereafter, the well-
known formal requisites of negotiable paper are set forth.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Roughly speaking, the law merchant had its most unfettered
and spontaneous growth from the time of the Norman Conquest
until the decline of the staple system during the sixteenth cen-
tury.2 During these four or five hundred years, the law merchant
was a separate body of law that developed solely from the custom
and practice of merchants and was administered by merchants.
This development reached its peak with the establishment of the
staple courts in 1353 by the Statute of Staples.3 By resort to
these courts the merchants were able to receive justice based on
their own business customs without hazarding the procedural
rigidity of the common law courts. The concept of negotiability
became highly developed during this period, as did the law of
assignments. The staple courts followed the policy of allowing
the merchants to develop, through custom, new types of instru-
ments and to make alteration in the existing ones as they became
necessary.
The decline of the staple courts was paralleled by an assump-
tion by the common law courts of jurisdiction over mercantile
disputes. At first these courts were willing to listen to evidence
as to the nature of the law merchant. Their generosity, however,
soon faded; they began to speak in terms of the law merchant's
being part of the common law, and they started to enunciate their
own ideas of what the law merchant had been. This resulted in
a repudiation of a sizable portion of the law merchant. Open
contempt for commercial practices reached its height when Lord
Holt held that promissory notes were non-negotiable in the cele-
brated English case of Clerke v. Martin.4 This and similar de-
cisions set the negotiability concept back nearly 300 years. The
plight of the merchant remained acute until the fortunate ap-
2. BRANNAN & CHAF, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAv, 2-19 (7th
ed., Beutel 1948).
3. This was the most important commercial law enacted in medieval
England. The courts set up by the statute had jurisdiction over all things
concerning staple commodities. This jurisdiction extended over contracts,
torts and crimes. The courts were presided over by the mayors of the staple
cities, who were required to be learned in the law merchant. The important
thing to remember is that these courts were in no way connected with the
common law system. Id. at 12.
4. 2 Ld. Raym. 757, 91 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1702). The unfortunate result
in this case led to the enactment of the Statute of Anne, 3 & 4 ANNE, C. 9(1704). This act established the negotiability of promissory notes and
codified that part of the law merchant.
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pointment to the bench of Lord Mansfield, the father of our mod-
ern commercial law. Commencing with his famous decision in
Miller v. Race,5 he began to formulate the law merchant as we
know it today, which was ultimately codified by the English Bills
of Exchange Act.6 Except, however, for the friendly hand ex-
tended by Mansfield, the attitude of the judiciary, when con-
fronted with business needs in this regard, has often reflected a
lack of sympathy.
In the United States, the law of negotiable instruments re-
mained largely uncodified until the cure-all philosophy of codifi-
cation swept this country during the latter part of the last cen-
tury. This development, that was fostered by David Dudly Field,
the great codifier, and the jurists of the analytical school, finally
resulted in the enactment of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument
Law as we know it today.
This brief outline demonstrates that the concept of negotia-
bility has been growing and changing ever since the -Jews began
to circulate starrs7 soon after the Norman Conquest. Has this
evolution reached the end of the line? Has the concept of nego-
tiable instruments reached a point where there is nothing left to
be desired? It does not seem that an affirmative answer would be
any more appropriate now than it was during the eighteenth
century when progress in this respect was momentarily halted.8
In spite of this obvious truism, however, the overall attitude
of the courts has been one of opposition to any change instigated
by the commercial world. Similar resistance by the legislatures
has likewise been evident9
Whenever this resistance has weakened and the existing law
has been changed, it usually became crystallized as of the date of
the change, and the process started all over again. No affirmative
5. 1 Burr. 452, 2 Keny. 189, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758) (holding that
ownership of a negotiable instrument may be acquired through a thief).6. 45 & 46 Vicr., c. 61 (1882), drafted by Judge Chalmers in 1881.
7. This was probably the earliest type of negotiable paper known to
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Its purpose was to be a written evidence of
a debt, such type of transaction being peculiar to the Jews because their
religious beliefs did not prevent the charging of interest as did the Chris-
tian religion.
An adequate bibliography of this period may be found in BRANNAN &
CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8-9.
8. See Clerke v. Martin, 2 Ld. Raym. 757, 92 Eng. Rep. 6 (K.B. 1702).
9. For an excellent discussion of the problem, see Devlin, The Relation
Between Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, 14 MoD. L. Rtv. 249(1951).
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policy has ever been followed whereby the necessary flexibility
was provided which would permit desirable changes.
Perhaps the outstanding example of crystallization of existing
law is the Negotiable Instruments Law itself. Section 1 of this
Act states emphatically that, "[a]n instrument to be negotiable
must conform to the following requirements."1 [Italics supplied]
Thus, the formal requisites of negotiability became frozen as of
the time a state adopted the Negotiable Instruments Law; and
the development of any new type of negotiable instrument was
stymied.
A partial explanation of the broad, sweeping, all-inclusive
language of Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law may be
found in the historical background of the Act. J. J. Crawford of
New York relied heavily on the existing California Civil Code1"
in drafting the proposed Negotiable Instruments Law. 2 The
California Code also set out stiff requirements for negotiability;
in fact, the similarity of the mandatory wording of the two acts
is striking. The most important reasons which have been ad-
vanced that prompted this complete coverage are twofold: first,
the California Code was spreading in popularity so that the uni-
form law had to be more than a mere narrow rival; and second,
the conflicting welter of statutes dealing with negotiable paper
in the various states had to be repealed in toto. Partial repeal
would probably have resulted in even greater confusion than
existed previously.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE "MUST CONFORM" POLICY OF THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
Legal history is filled with the conflict between those who
favor certainty and those who favor flexibility. The Negotiable
Instruments Law is an extreme example of the desire for cer-
tainty. While the result of certainty may have been achieved for
the aforementioned practical purposes, there is little doubt that
the expedience of the moment had unfortunate consequences.
The stereotyping effect of codification was exhibited in the
10. Then follows a listing of the formal requisites for negotiable instru-
ments. The next nine sections elaborate on and attempt to provide guide-
posts for the proper construction of Section 1.
11. It might be noted that the California Civil Code was drafted by
David Dudly Field, who was referred to earlier in this article as the lead-
ing exponent of codification during the latter part of the 19th century.
12. BRANNAN & CHAFM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 76-78.
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well-known case of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan.13 That case con-
cerned the negotiability of interim receipts. The receipts did not
call for payment of "a sum certain in money"'14 but were payable
to bearer in Belgian bonds "when, as, and if" issued. The receipts
had been stolen, and, therefore, the crucial question was whether
the receipts were negotiable and enforceable by a good faith
purchaser. Considerable evidence was introduced to prove that
these instruments had, by virtue of custom and usage, long en-
joyed the status of negotiable instruments. The court held that
the receipts failed to meet the compulsory requirments of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. They were not payable in money,
nor payable at a time certain. While paying deference to the
argument that permitting the business world to create new
methods and instruments would result in social gain, Justice
Cardozo said in the course of the opinion:
*. . [T]he law merchant is without capacity to make in-
struments negotiable against the express prohibition of a
statute, which says that they are not negotiable. 15
The New York Court of Appeals did recognize the possibility
of negotiability by contract or by estoppel. In view, however, of
some collateral statements made by the same court, this avenue
of escape from the rigid requirements of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law would not seem to hold much promise for New York
litigants. In Enoch v. Brandono the bonds involved contained a
provision that "' the bonds are to be treated as negotiable and all
persons are invited by the company to act accordingly.'" Never-
theless, by way of dictum, the court said, "[b] ut no such state-
ment will make negotiable a bond not in the form provided for by
our statute." 17 Also, in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, the court as-
serted that negotiability by contract or estoppel would not arise
merely by virtue of the fact that the document called for payment
to bearer.'s Therefore, the chance of bringing a case within the
suggested exception would appear to be small indeed.
Another, and far more common class of instruments that are
clearly not negotiable within the purview of the Negotiable In-
13. 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926). A number of other decisions might
be cited, such as Millard v. Green, 94 Conn. 597, 110 AtI. 177 (1920).
14. NFGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 1 (2).
15. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 48, 150 N.E. 594, 597 (1926).
16. 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
17. Id. at 266, 164 N.E. at 46.
18. See 242 N.Y. 38, 50, 150 N.E. 594, 598 (1926).
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struments Law, because they do not call for payment in money,
has been stamped with the attributes of negotiability as the re-
sult of the enactment of other statutes. Bills of lading and ware-
house receipts, entitling the holder to delivery of specific goods,
were not considered negotiable instruments under the common
law view. Such documents of title, even where the words "order,
or bearer" were used, were considered to be mere symbols of the
goods. As to a bill of lading, the Supreme Court of the United
States said:
.. True, it is a symbol of ownership of the goods covered
by it,-a representative of those goods. But if the goods
themselves be lost or stolen, no sale of them by the finder or
thief, though to a bona ide purchaser for value, will divest
the ownership of the person who lost them, or from whom
they were stolen. Why then should the sale of the symbol or
mere representative of the goods have such an effect?19
The adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law by a given
jurisdiction then gave rise to the possible argument that a bill
of lading could not even become negotiable by development of the
common law, because of the exclusive wording of the statute.
Such a result would have been very undesirable in view of the
customary treatment of order bills by businessmen as negotiable.
A number of other statutes, however, came into vogue shortly
thereafter which quite generally made the above argument aca-
demic. The Sales Act and Warehouse Receipts Act recognized
negotiable documents of title, although these two statutes only
partially adopted the mercantile view, wherein the purchaser
of a negotiable document of title may obtain more rights than
could a purchaser of the goods themselves. The Bills of Lading
Act espoused the full mercantile view at the outset. SubSequent
amendments to the Sales Act and Warehouse Receipts Act were
recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to
make the provisions on negotiability harmonious with the Bills
of Lading Act.20
To the list of instruments not accorded negotiable status by the
Negotiable Instruments Law must be added the share certificate
and the equipment trust certificate. The former has been given
treatment similar to that of a negotiable instrument by the Uni-
19. Shaw v. R.R., 101 U.S. 557, 564 (1879).
20. UNIFORm SALES ACT §§ 32, 38 (Commissioner's Notes); U m=IFOR
WA=EHOUSE RECEIPTS AcT §§ 40, 47 (Commissioner's Notes).
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form Stock Transfer Act, and the latter has been marked with
most of the features of a negotiable instrument by some local
statutes. 1 In the absence of such statutes it may be forcefully
argued that the implication of the Negotiable Instruments Law
is that the rights and privileges attendant upon the finding of a
negotiable instrument should not attach to a share certificate or
an equipment trust certificate. The same contention may be made
with respect to any document, certificate, or receipt which is not
controlled by some other statute and under which the obligor has
not unconditionally committed himself to the payment of money.
In order to reach what the courts have thought desirable results,
resort has been had to the weasel words "quasi-negotiable."22
But if this is a proper approach, why not apply the term to any
instrument which fails to qualify under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law but with respect to which there is evidence of usage
that it is treated as negotiable? Obviously this would lead to
clear circumvention of the opening sentence of the Negotiable
Instruments Law and should not be countenanced under any fair
principle of statutory construction. The Uniform Commercial
Code, therefore, comes as a welcome relief to this dilemma.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The problem of negotiability has not been dealt with in one
separate article in the Uniform Commercial Code. In fact, Ar-
ticle 3 on commercial paper, which deals with ordinary commer-
cial instruments such as checks, drafts, and promissory notes,
specifically excludes money, documents of title, and investment
securities from the scope of its coverage.2 3
Commercial Paper
It is the Code's new and basic approach that sparks the feeling
that the legislative policy is about to change. Upon enactment of
the Code it will be possible to have negotiable instruments that
do not fall within this or any other statute governing negotiable
paper.2 4
21. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §§ 511-513 (1930).
22. See Millard v. Green, 94 Conn. 597, 110 Atl. 177 (1920).
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-103 (1).
24. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104, comment 1:
.s. Even if retention of the old statutes is regarded in any state
as important, amendment of this section may not be necessary, since
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Article 3 specifically controls only those instruments mentioned
previously. The article, at least for present purposes, is tailor-
made for these instruments. No longer will it be necessary to
push the law ofnegotiable paper all out of shape in order to hold
bonds, securities, etc., negotiable.
The comment to Section 3-104 states that an instrument may
not be made negotiable within this article by contract or conduct.
The tenor of the comment seems to rule out even the possibility
of negotiability by estoppel. Estoppel may, however, present a
bar to the use of certain defenses which would otherwise be avail-
able where a non-negotiable instrument is involved.
Article 3 makes a good many changes in the prior law,25 settles
many conflicts in the existing case law that arose under the
Negotiable Instruments Law,26 and in some cases it has reverted
back to the law merchant.27 Admittedly these changes have an
effect on the broad concept of negotiability, but it is felt that they
have been amply discussed in other leading articles.
Documents of Title
The framers of the Uniform Commercial Code have rendered a
further service to the practitioner by the consolidation of the law
affecting documents of title. So many of the provisions of the
Uniform Bill of Lading, Warehouse Receipts and Sales Acts
overlap -that a merger was almost inevitable. Article 7 of the
Code is intended to replace the first two statutes and also Sections
27 to 40 of the Sales Act. It was properly decided that these sec-
'within this article' in subsection (1) leaves open the possibility that
some writings may be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial
decision. The same is true as to any new type of paper which commer-
cial practice may develop in the future.
Section 1-102 (f) states: "The Comments ... may be consulted in the con-
struction and application of this Act but if text and comment conflict, text
controls....
25. E.g., Section 3-206 and Section 3-304 (5) (e) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code are intended to change the result of Gulbranson-Dickinson Co.
v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N.W. 93 (1919), which held that an indorsee
under an indorsement in trust could not be a holder in due course and must
take the instrument subject to any defenses of equities good against his
indorser. But cf. Lipshutz v. Philadelphia Savings Fund Society, 107 Pa.
Super. 481, 164 Atl. 74 (1933).
26. E.g., UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105 (When Promise or Order
Unconditional).
27. E.g., UNIF M COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406, which adopts the doctrine
of Young v. Grote 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (1827), concerning the
negligence of the arawer in writing out the check, so that it "contributes"
to the alteration.
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tions, relating to documents of title, should not be replaced by
similar or revised provisions in Article 2 on sales, but that the
topics which they covered should be consolidated in one article.
The specific provisions defining negotiable documents of title,
however, cannot be accorded the same approbation. Section 7-
104 of the Uniform Commercial Code reads as follows:
(1) A warehouse receipt, bill of lading or other document of
title is negotiable
(a) if it provides for delivery to bearer or to the order
of a named person; or
(b) where recognized in overseas trade, if it runs to a
named person or assigns.
(2) Any other document is non-negotiable. [Emphasis
added.]
This smacks menacingly of the "must conform to the follow-
ing requirements" language of the present Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. Sub-section (2) is sweeping in its exclusion of all
other documents from the realm of negotiability. Suppose that a
bill of lading runs to a named person (the.magic words "order"
or "bearer" being omitted), and the issuer plainly marks it
negotiable. Such a document is a "straight" bill, and a subse-
quent transferee who purchases in good faith and for value will
not acquire the rights granted to a holder who takes upon due
negotiations.2- That such a result is mandatory is made clear by
the comment to Section 7-104: "A document of title is negotiable
only if it satisfies this section." The comment provides no expla-
nation as to why the approach to documents of title is contra to
that utilized in Article 3. There seems to be no logical reason
for the change of heart unless it is felt that the present docu-
ments of title are sufficient and that any gain that might result
from allowing innovations would be outweighed by the possibility
of confusion. It is submitted, however, that it is very difficult to
prophesy what will be the future needs of business.
Investment Securities
Bonds, debentures and similar forms of obligations used for
investment purposes have been segregated and are treated in
Article 8. Share certificates, equipment trust certificates, and
interim receipts also fall within the scope of that article which
28. Those rights are enumerated in Section 7-502 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
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will replace the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. At the present
time bonds are considered as falling within the provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. In their desire to find a number of
bond issues negotiable, many courts have strained their interpre-
tation of the Negotiable Instruments Law almost to the breaking
point. In Gerber's Estate29 the pertinent language on the bond
read as follows:
... This bond shall mature and become due on September
1, 1956, except as otherwise provided herein and in the deed
of trust securing this issue of bonds....
* . This bond is issued and held subject to the terms
and conditions of said deed of trust. .... 30
After stating that "whether the bond is negotiable must be
determined by what it says, and without resort to instruments
not attached to it,"' the court went on to hold that the bonds
were negotiable! Fortunately, under the Uniform Commercial
Code, the courts will no longer find it necessary to pull and tug
in order to squeeze bonds under laws designed to deal with short-
term obligations. The investment securities market, which had
its most rapid growth after the drafting of the Negotiable In-
struments Law, 3 2 has finally come into its own and has been be-
latedly recognized as deserving separate and unique treatment in
the statutory framework.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code the negotiability of a
bond will not be destroyed by reference on the face of it to con-
ditions stated in the deed of trust. And most defenses which a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument would cut off will
likewise be cut off, under the proposed provisions, by a bona fide
purchaser for value of a bond.33 Still, the conditions stated in the
deed of trust will be binding on the good faith purchaser if they
do not materially alter or contradict the language set forth on the
bond itself. This compromise between the two diametrically
opposed poles of the existing law-negotiability versus non-
negotiability-is a happy solution which provides for very de-
sirable flexibility.
29. 337 Pa. 108, 9 A.2d 438 (1939). This case is criticized in 6 U. OF PiTF.
L. REv. 200 (1940).
30. Id. at 122, 9 A.2d at 444.
31. Ibid.
32. See Cosway, Innovations in Articles Three and Four of the Uniforn
CommerciaZ Code, 16 LAw & CONT mP. PROB% 284, 286 (1951).
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-201.
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Today draftsmen of bonds are subject to two conflicting pres-
sures; one favors an instrument which clearly qualifies under the
Negotiable Instrument Law because of the better market, and the
other favors the inclusion of numerous conditions to protect the
issuer's interest. The latter tends to make the instrument non-
negotiable. In fact, that is the proper result if the reference on
the bond to the other document conditions the obligation to pay,
as distinguished from a reference of the holder to the document
to determine the holder's rights as to the security. With the
advent of the Uniform Commercial Code, draftsmen of bonds will
no longer have to worry about falling in the pond of non-nego-
tiability while skating close to the edge in an attempt to protect
the issuer.
PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW POLICY
It may well be asked, even in view of the apparent shift in
policy manifested by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, whether there will be any corresponding practical change.
Assuming that a businessman is conscious of the legal require-
ments for an instrument to be negotiable, will he risk the out-
come of future litigation by deliberately failing to conform to
such requirements when drafting his instrument or having it
drafted? Will he do this even if he is familiar with the use of
such non-conforming instruments in his field? Will the newly
won freedom of the businessman produce any practical changes,
or is it merely academic? Of course, even if it is concluded that
a businessman would not consciously take such risks, the problem
still remains a real one, i.e., what about the inadvertent failure
to conform to the requirements where negotiability is desired and
the instrument later gets into litigation? Here the existence of a
custom becomes crucial.
These questions may not appear to be of too much importance
if we only look at the instruments and documents in present use.
Such a limited consideration would ignore the historical evolution
of the negotiability concept. On the other hand, the authors do
not attempt to fill the role of seers in forecasting the precise
types of instruments that may come into common use. Yet a
look at the historical development of commercial paper will reveal
that the present forms are the products of timeless evolution-
not perceptible while it is going on and only fully recognized by
Washington University Open Scholarship
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belated hindsight. One could undoubtedly discover a good many
business practices carried on every day that are far out of line
with the existing law. They are prevalent because of convenience
and expedience. Who can say what legal status these practices
will attain? It is just as impossible to foresee what new instru-
ments will become necessary, as it would have been for the fif-
teenth century lawyer to visualize our modern concept of a nego-
tiable bill of lading.
History also reveals the method by which these changes have
been effected. Businessmen, heedless of the legal yoke placed on
them by the legislatures and the courts, constantly attempt to
remedy practical deficiencies in their present methods and devise
new ways to expedite the conduct of commerce. These new tech-
niques are not created with an eye toward the refinements of
jurisprudence but in spite of them. If the new technique proves.
to be of any real value, it will not be too long before it spreads
and becomes an established component of custom and usage.
When and if the instrument gets into litigation, it obviously will
be of utmost importance to determine whether its use is suffi-
ciently widespread as to fall within the meaning of the Code.
In the past these needs of businessmen have not been properly
recognized by the courts. This sort of judicial approach has not
only alienated the commercial world but has created many awk-
ward situations. Indeed, some have been so awvkward that they
even startled the usually slow-moving legislative branch into
quick action.3 4
It is here that the flexibility permitted by the Code becomes
most significant. No longer will the courts be bound by rigid re-
quirements which admit of no exception. In this sense a new era
is about to begin upon the acceptance of the Code by the legisla-
tures. It will then be possible for the courts to recognize new de-
vices which have acquired the status of custom and usage, arising
out of the faster modes of travel and improved media of commu-
nication. New and presently unknown methods of credit financ-
ing may reasonably be expected in the years to come. Even our
most advanced theory of negotiability may become antiquated,
requiring modifications to adapt itself to faster methods of dis-
tribution.
34. See note 4 supra.
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LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NEW APPROACH
Although it is clear that Section 3-104 does permit new instru-
ments to be developed despite failure to conform with the formal
requisites, 35 the Code leaves open the question of the attributes
of negotiability which may attach to such instruments. Of course,
evidence of custom and usage must be produced to warrant a
finding that the instrument is treated as negotiable. But then
such specific questions may arise as to what defenses will be
cut off, whether negligence in drafting an instrument will pre-
clude the defense of alteration, whether an indorsement is essen-
tial or whether given marks constitute valid indorsements, etc.
Answers to this type of question may not be provided by the
evidence which establishes the general customary treatment of
the paper as negotiable.
Where should the court look for such answers? It is submitted
that there are at least three main possibilities. First, the Uni-
form Commercial Code could be consulted for guidance. Second,
the court could examine the law merchant of the jurisdiction as
it stood prior to statutory modification. Third, it could construct
an entirely new body of case law which would be peculiarly
adapted to achieve the avowed purpose of the new instrument.
The first suggestion would probably represent the most con-
venient and effortless choice. The Code is a codification of the
most advanced equitable rules of negotiability down to the pres-
ent time.36 It would provide the court with a ready answer to
most of the specific questions that may arise. The choice, how-
ever, presents difficulties. The new instrument probably de-
veloped beyond the pale of the Uniform Commercial Code be-
cause of some obnoxious formal requisite set forth in the Code.
Giving controlling weight to the consequences that attach to an
instrument that conforms to the Code might very well defeat the
very reason for the existence of the new instrument.
To support the second alternative which calls for reference to
the law merchant, it may be argued that such was the legislative
intent when the legislature provided that a negotiable instrument
may exist beyond the ambit of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Further support for such a position may be found under one
35. See text supported by note 13 supra.
36. See Comment to Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code for
the equitable nature of the Code.
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possible interpretation of Section 1-103 of the Code, which states
that only those parts of the law merchant inconsistent with the
Code are repealed. But this alternative would be vulnerable to
the same objection as the prior one, that the then existing law
merchant is not geared to the function of the new instrument.
Now let us examine the third possibility in the light of Section
1-103. At first blush it would seem the least likely to succeed.
Upon close examination, however, it is submitted that it would
present the most realistic approach. Section 1-103 states: "Un-
less displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin-
ciples of law and equity, including the law merchant ... shall
supplement its provisions."
It is believed that the true meaning of this section can only be
discovered by a close reading of Section 1-102 (1), (2) and the
appropriate comment. 37 In order to implement the policy of this
section, the present law should be examined and those segments
that have remained valid should be retained, but those segments
that have become antiquated and outmoded by actual commercial
practice should be discarded. New rules should then be formu-
lated that would be tailor-made to meet the particular needs that
gave birth to the new instrument. Such approach would best ful-
fill the declared policy of the Code. 38
37. Section 1-102 (2) (b) reads as follows:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are...(b) to preserve flexibility in commercial transactions and to en-
courage continued expansion of commercial practices and mecha-
nisms through customs, usage and agreement of the parties ....
[emphasis added].
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
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